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Abstract—In this paper, we study roles of social mechanisms
in a financial system. Our data come from a novel on-line foreign
exchange trading brokerage for individual investors, which also
allows investors to form social network ties between each other
and copy others’ trades. From the dataset, we analyze the
dynamics of this connected social influence systems in decision
making processes. We discover that generally social trades
outperform individual trades, but the social reputation of the top
traders is not completely determined by their performance due to
social feedback even when users are betting their own money. We
also find that social influence plays a significant role in users’
trades, especially decisions during periods of uncertainty. We
report evidences suggesting that the dynamics of social influence
contribute to market overreaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the interests on social influence and social dy-
namics are growing with the rise of Computational Social
Science [1]. We see increasing research efforts in measuring
and understanding different social dynamics systems: online
systems like Twitter, and real living systems ranging from
discussion groups [2], a dormitory community [3] to a New
England town [4], to name a few.
One particularly interesting type of social systems are the
financial systems. Though financial systems have been ana-
lyzed dominantly with physics stochastic calculus (i.e. random
walk) models such as Black-Sholes [5], they are with no doubt
driven by the collective behavior of humans. Key aspects of
social science, such as the existence of social influence and the
topology restrictions on information flow, are rarely discussed
by finance researchers [6]. By adopting social theories into the
analysis of different financial systems, this approach may be
able to better explain the many mysterious phenomena in the
markets, such as overractions and market crash.
On the other side, financial systems are among the best
quantitatively documented systems, with datasets of transac-
tions in mill-second resolution. Though many of the data are
still only about trades rather than networks, researchers are
able to infer the network properties of financial systems with
newly developed tools [7] [8] to understand the underlying
connectivity from individual trades. In addition, new finan-
cial data with explicit social relationships are also becoming
available [6].
In this work, we demonstrate how the study of financial
systems, from the Computational Social Science point of
view, can lead to interesting results for some general social
science questions. We also demonstrate that the understanding
of financial systems with social science perspectives can be
turned into profitable hedging and trading strategies.
Our work is based on a novel retail online brokerage known
as ”eToro” (http://www.etoro.com). eToro provides users easy
tools to trade in foreign exchange and commodity markets.
The most important feature of eToro is that users can also
look at other users and follow others’ trades. We will discuss
the detail of our eToro dataset in Section II. Based on this
dataset, we will demonstrate how two fundamental challenges
in social science are also the fundamental challenges inside
the eToro financial system:
The first challenge is whether we can elicit optimal de-
cisions from the wisdom of the crowd. From the literature
one may expect that financial systems are among the best
crowd wisdom systems, as researchers believe that real cash
incentive is the driving force behind optimal rational crowd
wisdom [9] [10] [11]. We analyze the performance of the
crowd of eToro users in predicting experts( i.e. those who
will make the most money in the future), and we discuss the
potential causes of our observations. Our results suggest that
generally the crowd does much better than individuals. Still,
the eToro crowd is subject to social influence dynamics rather
than complete rational thinking even under strong monetary
incentives. The detail is in Section III.
The second challenge is to understand how social influ-
ence alters the dynamics of the crowd. Many social science
researchers have studied social influence dynamics on net-
works [7] [12], and naturally we expect such social influence
dynamics to exist in financial systems. With the eToro data,
we are able to closely examine how social influence changes
decision making process. We discover strong evidence that
social influence stimulates speculations and overreactions in
financial markets. The results are shown in Section IV.
Readers may argue that eToro is a special type of financial
markets, and our results may not be representative. We believe
that in the real financial world while market participants can
usually trade with any other participant in open platforms such
as NYSE, information flow, opinions and influence from other
peers, and the eventual trading decisions are often largely
constrained by the network connections of traders in a manner
similar to the eToro user network.
II. DATASETS
Our data come from eToro (See http://www.etoro.com),
an on line discounted retail broker for foreign exchanges
and commodities tradings with easy-to-use buying and short-
selling mechanisms as well as leverage up to 400 times. In
other words, eToro makes trading accessible and fun, as it
allows any user to take both long and short positions, with
a minimal bid of a few dollars. eToro also magnifies risks in
trades, as it allows user to be leveraged. As a result sometimes
traders do lose more than 100% of their position value in a
single transaction.
(a) Social Trading Landing Page
(b) Public Profile for a User
Fig. 1. We show the screenshots for the eToro social trading platform here:
a) The general landing page showing the current trades by other users and top
ranked traders. Users can click any trade to copy; b) A public profile page for
a eToro user (images and names removed), which contains his current trades,
messages and most importantly the number of followers mirroring his trades.
However, among all new features, the most interesting
feature of eToro is that it provides a social network platform
(known as The Open Book) for all traders. We illustrate the
main social trading interface in Fig. 1. Users can easily look
up other users’ trades, portfolios, and past performance. Users
can place three types of trades in eToro.
• Single trade: Users can place a normal trade by them-
selves.
• Copy trade: This mechanism allows a user to place a trade
exactly as another user’s one single trade. In the following
discussion, we will refer to this type of copying as ”copy
trade”. As shown in Fig. 1(a), users can review all current
real-time trades, and choose any one to copy.
• Mirror trade: This mechanism allows a user to pick an
example user. For every trade the example user makes,
eToro automatically executes the same trade on behalf
of the user. In the following discussion, we will refer to
this type of copying as ”mirror trade”. Fig. 1(b) shows
a user’s profile page, where other users can follow and
mirror all the trades of this user in his profile page. The
word ”follow” and ”mirror” in the following content is
interchangeable.
Our data are composed of over 5.8 million trades from
August 2010 to January 2012 (social trading features were
launched at early 2011). Among them 3 million trades are
non-social independent trades, and around 2.7 million trades
are automatically executed ”mirror trades” for each user by
copying trades from the people the user follows. The rest are
”copy trades” that users manually copied from other users’
trades.
Like many other crowd-sourcing tasks, the truth is in the
hands of the few. Overall most investors in eToro are losing
their investments. Though we have to recognize that this
period is the most difficult time for our financial systems,
it should be noted that eToro provides both long and short
mechanisms. Therefore, many successful traders can still profit
from shorting the market and other market neutral strategies.
We first look at some statistics of all transactions: on average
each trade lost 2.8% in its position size, with σ = 40%. The
overall total transaction in our datasets is over 47 millions
USD, and the total loss from users is around 2 millions USD.
User-wise, of all the users who have traded at least once, only
16% users were able to make a profit during the time period
in the dataset. This matches the common belief that in crowd
systems there usually exists a very small portion of elites [13].
Nevertheless, the promise in eToro lies in its social features:
In Fig. 2, we plot average daily ROI (Return On Investment)
of EUR/USD on all the trades of different categories. We find
that different types of trades lead to different levels of returns
(ANOVA p < 1e− 10), and mirror trades actually generate a
positive return (t-test, p < 0.005). At a first look, following
other users in the crowd seems to be a simple way to make
money, and social trades do outperform single trades. In this
paper, we will take a deep look into the crowd wisdom to
decode how social mechanisms alter crowd behaviors in the
eToro financial system.
In the following content, we only focus on one single
security, EUR/USD, which is the most liquid instrument on
eToro and counts for over 82% of all transactions on eToro.
III. ELICITING CROWD WISDOM FOR BEST TRADERS
While people do recognize the power of human computing
in certain tasks that machines are simply not able to do, it
is still unclear if a crowd can provide better predictions and
decisions about future events [10]. Many researchers defend
crowd prediction by suggesting that real money incentives are
important, and urge governments to allow real cash flow in
prediction market [9]. Financial systems provide the exact
mirror trades copy trades single trades
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Fig. 2. The mean ROI for all trades of the three types. The returns are
significantly different from each other (ANOVA p < 1e − 10), and mirror
trades generate significant positive return(t-test, p < 0.005).
unique perspective in understanding the crowd wisdom, as real
money incentives are always involved.
In eToro, one of the best strategies for users is actually
to mirror other traders’ strategies as seen in Fig. 2. User
A can choose to mirror a more sophisticated user B, and
eToro will automatically copy and execute user B’s all future
trades on behalf of user A. Naturally this mirroring behavior
implies strong trust in user B from user A, and users who
are mirrored and followed the most are likely to be the best
traders. We observe in Fig. 2 that mirroring actually generates
profit. However, we still would like to know how well the
crowd is performing in selecting its leaders to follow.
We study this problem by constructing trading strategies
using the wisdom of the crowd. We here construct two
portfolio strategies rebalanced daily. The first strategy, referred
as the Simple Best strategy, is constructed by looking at the
top t users on eToro platforms. On each day, we rank each
user by their accumulated continuously compounded return
up to this day, and execute the same trades of the top t users
by evenly dividing possessed capital among these users in this
day. If none of the top t users is trading on a particular day, we
don’t trade either. We construct the second social strategy by
analogy to the first Simple Best Strategy. Everything remains
the same except we rank users by their numbers of followers
rather than their return performance. The intuition behind this
strategy is that the best users recognized by the crowd are the
best users on the platform. We execute the same trades of the
top t mirrored users by evenly dividing capitals. We refer to
this strategy as the Social Best strategy.
In Fig.3, we plot the mean return and Sharpe Ratio for both
the Simple Best and Social Best Strategies. Sharpe ratio is
defined as the mean return divided by the risk (i.e. variance
of the return), which is a common financial metric for risk-
adjusted return [14]. It seems that the crowd did select a
reasonable set of trusted traders to follow, as their return
is significantly above average. Also, for both the top 5 and
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Fig. 3. The mean daily ROI and Sharpe Ratio for both the Simple Best
strategy and the Social Best strategy. (*: Both returns are significantly above
zero in t-test with p < 0.01; **: only the Simple Best strategy return is
significantly above zero; ***: neither strategy is significantly above zero with
p > 0.1.)
the top 10 strategies, we notice that the performance of the
crowd and the performance of the simple best strategy are
almost equivalent. However, the Sharpe ratio of the crowd is
slightly higher. We suspect that this is due to the fact that
crowds are more risk averse. However, when we extend our
portfolio to top 50 users using both strategies, we notice that
the performance of the crowd drops significantly.
Fig. 3 provides a lot of information: it seems that it is
possible to profit from the top users, but there are very few of
them. Increasing the diversity of the selected users beyond top
10 will immediately reduces profitability. Another interesting
observation is that the crowd performs really well in selecting
its top leaders, but fails to outperform a simple algorithm when
being asked to select more experts.
To answer this problem, we also plot from the top 20%
users the distributions on their accumulated returns and their
numbers of followers in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) respectively.
It is clear that for performance, very few users exhibit strong
trading skills, and the distribution suggests an exponential de-
caying distribution. However, the number of followers follow
a power-law long tail distribution, and unlike trading skills,
the distribution is much flatter.
A. Discussion
Our results match very well with a well-known cultural
market study [15], in which the crowd votes for the best songs
on an artificial online music sharing website where previous
user votes are recorded and displayed. The sharing website
has multiple independent universes to attend for repeat studies.
Researchers discovered that the ”best” songs always rank at
the top, but most songs had uncertain ranking outcomes in
different universes. In eToro, the top 10 best traders recognized
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Fig. 4. From the top 20% users the distributions on both (a) the accumulated
return and by (b) the number of followers are plotted here. The distribution of
followers show strong power-law pattern, but the accumulated return follows
an exponential decay.
by accumulated performance and crowd choices generate
comparable return. However, when we further diversify our
portfolio by including more top followed users, we start to
realize that the crowd’s selected experts have less certain skills,
just like many top ranked songs in the cultural market study.
We suspect that the process of expert eliciting on eToro
is similar to a preferential attachment model [16], because
in eToro users are also provided with the information of the
number of followers about another user. We notice that the
number of followers in Fig. 4(b) forms a distribution close to
a power-law curve rather than the exponential distribution of
user performance in Fig. 4(a), which is a strong indicator for
preference attachment behavior [16]. In other words, users are
heavily affected by the existing number of followers when
making mirroring decisions, even when eToro completely
discloses trading performance and ranks. Under a fully rational
model, users’ preference should always match the traders’
performance. However, we examine the performance of the
top 300 most followed users in the system (Fig. 5), and we
find that ranking doesn’t correlate with the performance. Our
finding contradicts the common view for collective intelligence
researchers who argue that strong monetary incentives induce
more rational decisions [11], and we argue that social feed-
back does sometimes overweight individual rational thinking.
We believe the reason lies in the fundamental basis of the
evolutionary human cognitive structure [17].
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Fig. 5. We plot the accumulated return for the top 300 most followed users in
eToro. Except for the top ones, most users’ performance seems to be irrelevant
of their ranking.
IV. SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING
Besides mirroring other users, eToro also allows users to
copy a single trade rather than every trade from another user
(the copy trade type). Users can log into the Open Book to
look for other users’ trades, and click to copy one trade. If a
user copies a trade, it implies that the user has come to the
Open Book and consulted other users’ trades. He/she made the
decision based on his/her own judgment as well as the social
influence from others. It should be mentioned that copying
trades are less common (≈ 2% of all transactions) in eToro.
There is a long line of research studying the effects on social
influence in different domains, such as health [4], purchase
behavior [18] [19], to name a few. eToro datasets provide us
an unique opportunity to unveil social influence in financial
trading behavior, and our paper is the first one on this topic
as far as we know. Most of the time researchers are unable to
know exactly what information and influence a trader receives
before making trades, while in eToro we know that all copy
trades are clearly under social influence.
We define the following notation: for each day d, we
compute the percentage of long trades among all single trades
denoted as sd, and the percentage of long trades among all
copy trades as cd. We also refer to sd as single market
perspective, and cd as crowd market perspective.
We here plot sd and cd in Fig. 6. Our discovery is surprising:
while individual beliefs in buys and sells are fairly stable, the
speculations in copy trades are a magnitude more volatile (σ2 :
0.006 vs. 0.03, F-test p < 10−36). Therefore with explicit
social inputs, users tend to become more extreme rather than
converge. Social influence seems to play an important role in
driving market volatility.
We plot (sd, cd),∀d on a 2-d space, and the results are
illustrated in Fig. 7. Fig. 7 clearly suggests that a linear corre-
lation with slope=1.37. In other words, the explicit exposure
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Fig. 6. Daily single market perspective and daily crowd market perspective.
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Fig. 7. The single market perspective versus the crowd market perspective
for all trading days.
to others’ trades drives the market further from parity. For
example, when 60% of the crowd individually decides to short
the stock, exposing the crowd to others trading behaviors will
likely push 80% of the crowd to short. If we believe that the
average individual opinion of the market is the best price of the
market, then social influence seems to encourage overreaction
and to drive the market to extreme.
Now we know that social influence has effects on trading
behaviors, we continue to investigate that if such influence is
consistent all the time. We first define the market trend tid.
tid = pd − avg(pd−i:d), (1)
where pd is today’s price, and avg(pi−d:d) is the average price
from the previous i days, with i as the average window size.
The price trend is to eliminate high frequency noise from the
market trend. If tid is positive, the market has a up-going trend;
otherwise the market tends to go down.
We correlate both sd and cd with different values of
i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 20}, and shift the trend days forward
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Fig. 8. The correlation coefficient between cd and tid of different window
size i shifted from -3 days to 3 days. The largest correlation occurs when
market trend is one day after, with an average window size of 7 and 14 days.
and backward to check if eToro users’ market perspective
predicts or follows the market trend. We find that there is
no significant correlation between market trend and individual
sd (r < 0.02, p > 0.10). However, we observe a strong
correlation between the crowd market perspective and the next
day’s price trend (r = −0.35, p < 0.1). The results are shown
in Fig. 8 for different window sizes for market trends and
different shifts.
We clearly see Fig. 8 that the strongest correlation is at
i ≈ 10 with tomorrow’s market trend. As a result, social copy
trades can actually be used to predict tomorrow’s market trend.
Also notice that the coefficient in Fig. 8 is negative, which
means that the more long social trades are today (long trades
imply expectation of market recovery), the more likely the
market is going down tomorrow with respect to its weekly
average. We plot both the sd and tid (shifted by one day) with
i = 14 in Fig. 10, and it is pretty visible to notice that when
sd goes extreme in one direction, tid usually goes the opposite
direction.
Surprisingly, such observation connects well with one of
the most popular hedge funding trading strategy: the mean
reversion strategy [20], which argues that all aggressive market
reaction is overreaction, and the market will correct it quickly.
The mean reversion strategy then bets on the opposite direction
of today’s stock trends the next day or so. In our results,
the negative correlation suggests that aggressive copy tradings
often lead to market overreaction, and the market quickly
corrects in the near future.
A. Social Reversion Strategy
We can use similar ideas from the mean reversion strategy
to construct a trading strategy. We balance the portfolio daily.
If we notice a day with strongly biased copy trades (cd > 0.65
or cd < 0.35), we will long or short the security with 0.5− cd
fraction of the total capital we have, which is merely betting
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Fig. 9. The mean daily ROI for our mean reversion strategy based on copy
trades overreaction. We plot the daily ROI with different holding periods, and
we discover that holding 2 to 3 days for market correction provides the best
positive return (*: significantly positive with t-test p < 0.01).
against the crowd market perspective. The stronger the bias,
the more weights we put into our bets. We then hold the
position for a certain number of days. Fig. 9 shows the mean
ROI for different holding periods, and it seems that waiting 2
or 3 days for market to correct is the most profitable. Since
foreign exchange prices move slowly, in this example we
increase leverage to 30×.
B. Discussion
In Fig. 7, we observe that social influence is increasing
trading reactions. We argue this is an intuitive observation
with the following simple model: Assume a user i at time
d is likely to buy an instrument at probability p (denoted
as Prob(Xi = 1) = p) and short an instrument at 1 − p
(denoted as Prob(Xi = 0) = 1 − p). If user i consults with
another user j sharing a common buy view, the probability of
user i buying an instrument will increase by a, 0 ≤ a  1.
Such social influence assumption is based on the common
properties of adoption models [18]. Vice versa, if j has a
sell view, the probability of user i buying an instrument will
be decrease by a. Assuming user j has the same distribution
Prob(Xj = 1) = p, we have:
E(Xi after consulting j)
= (p+ a)× Prob(Xj = 1)
+(p− a)× Prob(Xj = 0)
= (p+ a)p+ (p− a)(1− p)
= (2a+ 1)p− a. (2)
With a slope of 1.37 from eToro, we have a = 19%.
With the 2008 economic crisis being still vivid in everyone’s
mind, understanding the vulnerability of the financial systems
becomes one of society’s most important problems. Financial
researchers have long been aware of the fact of market
overreaction and often profit from it [20], and there exist a lot
of theories to explain the overreaction [21]. However, eToro
data has provided us a unique view on the social influence
behavior of traders: The mere fact that a trader looks up on
other traders’ records will increase trading strategy volatility
and market overreaction. We believe that this is an important
mechanism for the dynamics of financial systems.
What also surprises us is the result demonstrated in Fig. 8
and Fig. 10. which suggests that social trading can be used as a
prediction signal while individual trades can not. We think that
each user may have different speculation tendency at different
times, and therefore the parameter a is dynamic rather than
static. When the market is full of uncertainty and users are
more likely to speculate, users are more vulnerable to external
influence in decision making processes and tend to overreact.
On the other hand, when users are more certain about the
market, the external influence plays a less important role in the
decision making process. Therefore, the strong signals from
social copy trades can be a measure of overreaction as well as
market uncertainty, which usually indicates a potential change
in market direction.
To better illustrate this point, we also look at the ratio
between the daily number of copy trade transactions and
the number of single trade transactions. We correlate the
ratio of daily single trades over copy trades with the mar-
ket daily volatility computed using a exponential smoother
λ = 0.80 for computing the exponentially weighted volatility
risk metric [22] for EUR/USD. The results are shown in Fig.
11. It seems that the two curves correlate positively with
R = 0.19, p < 0.001. This implies that users are less likely
to be under others’ influence and trust more in their own
views in the case of strong volatility. Therefore, a very strong
piece of information or a clear market trend actually inhibits
peer influence and promotes self judgments. As a result, when
social influence effects are strong, the market is usually at an
uncertain stage, and therefore the crowd market perspective is
more overreaction over rational estimations.
V. CONCLUSION
We observe the effects of two social mechanisms in the
eToro financial system: namely the effects of social feedback
in eliciting experts and the effects of social influence when
others’ trades are available to users. We find that social trading
provides much better opportunities for profiting compared with
individual trading. We discover that the eToro crowd is making
excellent but sometimes not optimal decisions in selecting
experts when they can see others’ choices. Our finding sheds
light on many crowd wisdom systems which expect users to
be fully rational under strong financial incentives. We argue
that social effects are so strong that they sometimes override
the rational assumptions. We also discover that users are prone
to much riskier behavior when following their peers, and are
much likely to overreact when their peers are doing so and the
market is uncertain. This may explain the natural fluctuation of
financial markets when there is no external information [23].
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Fig. 10. We plot the crowd market perspective together with the one-day-behind real market trend smoothed by a one-week average window. We notice that
the crowd market perspective strongly negatively correlates with the next-day market price.
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Fig. 11. Volatility of EUR/USD vs. the ratio between single and copy trades.
Future works include a more accurate behavioral model for
trading decision making under social influence, and a better
way of hedging and portfolio constructions to leverage the
potential of crowd wisdom at the same time eliminating the
negative effects of social mechanisms on financial systems.
Considering the fact that financial systems after all are com-
posed of humans, we believe that this direction of research is
potentially valuable.
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